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The Place of Archery in Greek Warfare
The Ancient Greek Archer: . . . at work & war
by Tom Winter
Summary: Despite the ancient Greek equivalent of an Agincourt,
the Greek military mind ﬁrmly retained the heavy infantry, rather
than the archers, as the main force. Recognized uses of the archer
in Greek warfare were to fend oﬀ heights of city walls, to perform
commando raids, and to provide covering ﬁre for commando-style
operations. This essay, written after a fresh reading of the principle
Greek historians, puts together all passages where one can see the
ancient Greek archer at work and in his military setting.

W

hen Pericles proclaims the catalog of Athenian forces at the
beginning of the Peloponnesian War (431–404), the array
looked like this:
15,000 ﬁrst-line hoplites
1,600 reserve hoplites
1,600 cavalry (including mounted archers)
1,200 archers
300 warships
Archers comprised, then, roughly 10 percent of an ancient Greek
city’s military force. We want to ask, of course, what they did with
these archers. This in turn requires seeing the system of Greek land
warfare.
Pericles’ list of forces lets us see the relative numbers, but is somewhat misleading, as it omits a major category, the light-armed soldier;
a man armed with shield and spear, but, unlike the hoplite, not protected by body armor.
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Fully armed hoplite.
The cutout becomes a view-port
when the shield is up.

The attendant solves the
Assyrian archer’s shield problem.

The system of the use of all these will become clearest fastest if divided into two categories, those who stand and ﬁght, and those who
can range over a distance or who have range and distance.
The hoplites are the Sherman Tanks of antiquity. Their armor is
cast and hammered bronze. Bronze, please remember, is heavier than
iron. Typically, if a hoplite is to run, he must jettison armor. He is not
mobile, and is no ranger. The light armed trooper is naked but for his
shield and helmet. He is called variously psilos “light”, gymnetes “bareman” or akontistes, “spearman.” Slingers and archers fall into the same
category, except neither can, of course, both do his job and manage a
shield. Generally, the psilos is, in fact, a ranger on foot. He can be seen
in several Greek engagements running on a corps of hoplites slinging
his spear (it had a long thong on its balance point, spiraled around it)
and then getting out of counter-throw range, fast. Though the Assyrian archers had a shield-holding teammate, the Greek archer seems to
have been completely unarmored, defended utterly by the range of his
weapon. The cavalryman, hippeus, is variously armed with spears, sabers, and/or the bow.
None of these can stand toe-to-toe with a corps of hoplites. For

that, another corps of hoplites is needed. This is not to say, however,
that only hoplites can defeat hoplites. Far from it. We see most clearly
what each “branch of service” has for its proper use by watching what
happens when a particular branch is missing.
Let’s begin with cavalry. Ten thousand Greek mercenary hoplites
had marched into the Persian empire with Cyrus to help him wrest
the empire from his brother (401–400 B.C.). They defeated the Persians at the end of their battle line, but as their employer Cyrus was
killed in the battle, they were faced with having to get out of 1,500
miles of unfriendly territory. Although they had smashed all opposing Persians, they were very dubious about their chances. They had
NO cavalry.
What did it mean to them? The Ten Thousand all knew what it
meant, and Xenophon expressed it this way:
“But since we have no cavalry, if we win we can’t kill anybody, and
if we lose we all die.”
Expanding upon this, we can also see the advantage of the gymnetes: victorious hoplites keep their armor, and cannot catch retreating
hoplites who jettison theirs.
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An interesting implication, which we will see happen in history, is
that hoplites alone cannot defeat the gymnetes, who can always simply run away from them. To put the cap on a victory, the ancients
needed the cavalry to run down and beat them. If defeated, the Ten
Thousand would be unable to escape the enemy cavalry. One needs
cavalry, then, to fend oﬀ the enemy cavalry to cover the escape of overmatched hoplites. The Syracusan Expedition, as related in Book Six
of Thucydides, is a beautiful illustration. The Athenian Expedition
against Syracuse shipped no cavalry. The people of Syracuse were
strong in cavalry. In the ﬁrst big battle before Syracuse, the Athenians
won, driving the inexperienced and diﬃdent Syracusan heavy infantry before them.
But no. The battle was indecisive, for the Syracusan horsemen
kept cutting oﬀ the pursuit. Whichever part of the Athenian front
came ahead too far in pursuit suddenly had mounted rangers spearing them and running. The Athenians “won,” but they couldn’t kill
anybody: without cavalry, their victory was reduced to a stand-oﬀ, a
draw! This is the extreme of the no-cavalry handicap.
On the Syracusan side, they “lost” but nobody died. Their cause
was still safe: it was as if the battle had not taken place! They had the
ancient equivalent of “command of the air.”
We observe: Hoplites can defeat hoplites, but hoplites cannot defeat a combined force of hoplites and cavalry.
The next thing the Athenian expeditionary force does, of course,
is to send home for cavalry. They do this, plus one other thing: they
send home for archers for the express purpose of fending oﬀ the enemy cavalry. To deal with soldiers with range, a weapon with range.
This lets us see that the archer was a relatively cheap and easily transportable means of dealing with a superior cavalry force.
A beautifully clear interplay of hoplites, archers, and akontistai is
seen in the career of Demosthenes in the Peloponnesian War. Demosthenes was an independent thinker. Settled with an expeditionary
naval force oﬀ shore of what is now Albania, he let the local islanders
talk him into an expedition inland against their enemy, the Aitolians.
Demosthenes acceded to this adventure thinking of nothing less
than conquering his way clear across the mainland to the northern

shores of the Aegean Sea. The islanders told him that the Aitolians
were just light armed, and he should take them quickly.
He did—at ﬁrst. The three towns were march-overs. Unfortunately for Demosthenes’ career, the Aitolians were retreating and gathering until they had enough spear power to stop the hoplites. At the
town called Aigition we ﬁrst see gymnetes defeat heavy infantry.
Thucydides’ description of the battle is called “a series of pursuits and
returns, with the Athenians at a disadvantage going in each direction.”
The Aitolians’ single weapon, the spear, could eventually prevail. The
Athenian force, decisively better, had to break up, jettison, and straggle to the shore through the forests.
Archers? Yes, Demosthenes did have some archers. Studying the
battle, one sees the passage, “The Athenians were all right so long as
their archers had arrows.”
Adding the battle of Aigition to what we have already seen, we
have as follows: Hoplites cannot defeat gymnetes. Gymnetes can defeat hoplites. Therefore, hoplites need archers to keep the gymnetes at
a distance.
Interestingly, Demosthenes learned and applied this lesson of
Aigition in his next adventure, at Pylos and its near oﬀshore island,
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Greek mounted archer at work
discouraging hoplite pursuit.
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The light armed trooper to naked but for his shield and helmet.

Sphacteria. Sphacteria was a small island, long and narrow, on the
west coast of Peloponnese. Its length sheltered, and all but shut oﬀ,
the bays of Pylos from the sea. The bayshore included a rising bit of
cliﬀ, in which Demosthenes recognized a strategic opportunity. His
expedition force fortiﬁed the place. This put a spear at the Spartan
throat, as the place was but 40 miles from Sparta.
The Spartans, to counter, put a force of three hundred hoplites on
the island. This would help them control the bay, and, they intended,
to help shut oﬀ the fort from seaborne support. Cleon, boasting in
Athens that he could bring the Spartans oﬀ Sphacteria dead or alive
in 20 days, was given an expeditionary command to fulﬁll his boast.
What force did he take? He, too, had learned Demosthenes’ lesson of
Aigition. He took no hoplites at all, just spearmen and archers!
Sharing the command with Demosthenes, who was afraid to come
home after Aigition, Cleon succeeded.
Cleon and Demosthenes put a small force of heavy infantry on one
end of the island, but never moved them. They were bait. The Spartan heavies, seeing their enemy, boldly marched to battle. The Athenians didn’t move. The Spartan heavies had to cover all the distance
themselves.
They never got there. The archers were stationed in clusters at the
ﬂanks, with light-armed akontistai, and slingers. Secure in the doc6
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trine that the real battle happened when hoplite lines met, the Spartans marched through a gauntlet of arrows and slung spears. Thucydides relates “The Spartan helmet was not proof against penetration
by arrows!””
The surviving Spartans retreated, taking refuge in an old abandoned fort on some high ground. This gave them a breather until
a body of archers found a way around to the other side. Their ﬁre
quickly made the Spartan position hopeless. At this point, Demosthenes and Cleon, seeing that the Spartans would all die, gave the remaining Spartans a chance to surrender.
Much to everyone’s surprise, they did. It was the ﬁrst time a Spartan force had ever done it. It created quite a stir throughout the
Greek-speaking world. People could not believe that the live Spartans were as brave as the dead ones. And Athenian, expressing such
a thought to the prisoners, got this response: “The arrow would be
quite a weapon if it just killed the brave.”
Archers can defeat hoplites.
Strange to relate, this seems to be the only ﬁghting in classical
Greek history of hoplites against archers. Further, it was the greatest
victory on land that the Athenians ever won in the entire war (431–
405 B.C.). Sphacteria demonstrated the decisiveness of the archers’
advantage over heavy infantry. Yet this seems never to have been followed up until the age of the English longbow.
Demosthenes and Cleon learned from Aigition and produced
Sphacteria, but Sphacteria produced, among the Greeks, no strategic oﬀspring. It was too diﬃcult to break out of the idea that the real
battle was always when the heavies met the heavies. The least intelligent use of archers seems, when it appears, to be the typical way: relating one major Syracusan battle, Thucydides states the light-armed
(spearmen, archers, cavalry) fought ﬁrst and it went this way and that,
“as light-armed battles do,” and then the battle took place when the
hoplite forces met. This is just a matter of letting the shrinking range
between two oncoming forces dictate the type of soldier and the type
of weapon used: ﬁrst, the long range soldiers and long range weapons;
then the toe-to-toe soldiers and their toe-to-toe weapons.
7
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An attendant keeps an Assyrian mounted archer supplied with arrows.

If the archer can defeat the hoplite, why was this lesson lost upon
the Greeks? Probably because they had so decisively defeated the Persians, whose main weapon was the bow. We must ask how.
We get the clearest view of the ﬁghting of Greek hoplites with Persians in Herodotus’ description of the battle of Plataea in 480.
This was the ﬁnal battle of the Persian Wars, and ﬁrst it looked
like it was going pretty well for the Persians. Their mounted archers
kept milling around the encamped Greek army. Herodotus and the
Greeks at the time looked upon these losses as wasted, lost “before
the battle even started!” Pausanias, the commander of the Greek forces, kept sacriﬁcing as the arrows were coming in, waiting until the
omens were auspicious. Finally, the lobes of the livers looked right,
and the Greek heavies advanced.
They faced an army that tried to combine the archer and the toeto-toe warrior. The Persians kept shooting at the advancing hoplites
until they were too close; they then had to prepare to welcome the
Greeks hand-to-hand. But as archers, they had put their shield down.
You can’t hold a hugh heavy shield on your left hand and still shoot a
bow; so the Persian style was to set their shield down together, making a barricade of them. The Greeks marched through the shield barricade. The Persians fought Greek heavies while shieldless themselves.
It was a slaughter. Greek sources glory in the valor of the Greek hop-

lites. Yes, they did have the machismo to march through arrows, but
if archers let heavies close with them, the result is foregone.
From their glorious victory over the land forces of the Persian
army, the Greeks, I believe, learned some of the wrong lessons. Permit
me a what-if: what if Mardonius, the Persian general, had realized his
mounted archers were on to a good thing, and just left the Greeks to
them, keeping the host out of range, except to keep the mounted archers supplied with arrows? This, of course, is precisely how the Parthians under Surena defeated Crassus, the Roman Proconsul of Syria and his Roman Legions at Carrhae in 53 B.C. It would also have
worked in 480.
For an army on the march, the archer, and then the spear slinger,
were the ﬁrst line of defense against ambush. Throughout the Greek
historians, one sees a force marching through suspicious territory and
the commanding oﬃcer giving the order that the “spearmen march with
the spear on the throng, and the archers with the arrow on the string.”
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An akontistes spearman (as edited for appearance in a 1912
school text of Xenophon) from a Greek wine bowl.
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A Slinger.

Where the ancient Greeks best perceived the need for archers was
when an expeditionary force came to them: if an ancient city knew a
siege was facing them, what preparations would they make? As Mitylene prepares to secede from the Athenian Empire (428) we see the
city taking three preparations to undergo a siege: one was to buy
grain, second was to raise the height of the walls, and the third was to
bring in archers from Thrace.
In a siege, the defenders always have the height advantage. They
are throwing or shooting from the city walls, the oﬀense is shooting
from the ground. Mathematically, the height advantage goes with the
square root of two. If, for instance, you are shooting from twice as
high, your arrow goes 1.414 times as far. If you are on a battlement
50 feet high, and your opponent is shooting from ﬁve feet high, your

arrow goes seven times farther than his. (This is purely mechanical,
ignoring aerodynamics.)
The bow, among the Greeks, was the principal weapon for the city
besieged. The bow being so eﬀective in this situation explains why the
ﬁrst advance in ancient siege machinery was the movable tower. This
is the invention of Dionysius of Syracuse. You build it out of range,
as high as the city walls, or even higher, armor the front with hides,
move it up and give your archers a fair chance to clear the city walls.
Here, for once, is a situation where archers are ﬁghting archers as the
main event in ancient Greece. Though siege-towers were constructed
out of range, their could always be over-achievers: Philip II, king of
Macedon (359-336) and father of Alexander the Great, was inspecting siege-works when he got his most famous wound: an arrow from
the city walls knocked his eye out.
Archers on city walls turned many a tide, as victorious besiegers
routed a city’s land forces, and, in the excitement of pursuit, got too
close to the city walls! Xenophon presents one such instance, as but
the most recent of many such cases, relating the death of Teleutias.
Teleutias was an enterprising Spartan general. The Ephors of Sparta, having complete faith in him, sent him to take charge of the war
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against Olynthus, on the northern shores of the Aegean Sea. Part of
his forces were engaged in destroying the Olynthian gardens, farms,
and orchards, as the other warded oﬀ Olynthian cavalry and lightarmed troops who would try to prevent them. Angered by the success
of some Olynthian rangers against his own, he commanded his more
mobile forces to pursue the Olynthians and keep pursuing them,
backing them up with an advance of hoplites marching in their line.
Their hot pursuit took them within shooting distance of the city
walls. The defending archers, seeing their chance, waited for a bit of
committing space, and then decimated the Spartan forces. As the
Spartans withdrew, the Olynthians then sent out a counter-attack,
and turned the withdrawal of the Spartan forces into a route. Xenophon, introducing the episode, observes that a “Force pursuing up to
a city often has diﬃculty getting away.” His epilogue is that “A commander must never issue an order in the heat of anger.”
Archers are absolutely necessary for the besieged to cover any
sneak attacks upon the besieging lines. There are three such events in
Thucydides’ coverage of the Peloponnesian War. The island of Melos
(where the Venus de Milo was found) was outside the Athenians’ empire of islands, and they wanted it in. They, therefore, besieged its city.
Their technique, since the city of Melos was well upland from its harbor, was to build a wall completely around it. Twice the Melians successfully raided the magazine of the Athenian line, escaping back into
the town with supplies stolen from the Athenians. The how of this
is visible in Thucydides’ narration of the break-out of the Plataeans.
The Spartans besieged Plataea, most of whose citizens were living in
Athens, having retreated there because of the war. At the time of the
siege (428), the town was a garrison of 400 soldiers, and 120 women
to bake their bread. Sparta put a double wall around it; one against
the Plataeans, one outside against any relieving force from Athens.
On each side of the double wall was a ditch. There were ten towers
interrupting both sides of the double wall and ﬂush with the outside
of the double wall, which served as observation and strong points.
The Plataeans decided on a breakout.
They prepared ladders and awaited a moonless and stormy night.
That winter, a hard freezing storm came up that ﬁlled the bill. The

Spartans took shelter in the towers, leaving the walls unmanned.
Armed for traveling, 200 Plataeans made the attempt. As they went
up and either went over or took watch positions on the wall, the
storm covered any noise they made until a lookout on a tower roof
knocked down a rooftile. As the Spartans came out to investigate, archers from rooftops and from the ditches shot down the oncoming
Spartans, aiming at the parts not covered by armor.
The Plataeans remaining in the town raised a racket at the opposite side of the ring to confuse the Spartan besiegers. The Spartan force in ﬁrst line of readiness then came up; incredibly, they were
holding torches to light the way.
The Plataeans, by going at ﬁrst into enemy territory before cutting
around to get to Athens, eluded pursuit. The breakout was one of the
great successes of the war. “There was only one loss,” Thucydides records, “an archer at the last ditch.” It is left to us to ﬁgure that this is
the last of the rear guard, an unnamed hero who stayed back to keep
cutting oﬀ the Spartan pursuit until he himself was taken.
We must presume that the two successful commando raids of the
Melians were similarly a matter of time-consuming action taken under archery cover, and that there, too, were also anonymous archer
heroes.
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